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William F. Fox* 
 
Expected efficiency gains (reduction in efficiency losses) have been an important 
argument for replacing other taxes, and particularly sales taxes, with the VAT. However, 
the defense of these gains is often drawn from theoretical analysis of an optimal VAT and 
from indirect evidence but not from actual VAT practices. For example, Ebril et al (2001, 
p. 27) partly defend the efficiency gains from replacing a sales tax with a VAT by 
comparing the gains from sales taxes as they are actually imposed with a uniform 
consumption tax. But, VATs, like every other tax, are legislated in political environments 
where the resulting structure contains a series of warts as viewed from the economist’s 
perspective. Analysis of both the gains and the consequences of imposing VATs is most 
usefully accomplished in the context of the taxes as they are actually levied. Then, the 
efficiency gains that would result from a more efficient structure can also be evaluated, 
but as the difference between actual practice and the economist’s ideal.  
Of course, broad based consumption taxation, such as with a VAT, potentially 
distorts the labor-leisure choice, the savings-consumption choice (for example, depending 
on the expectations of future tax rates), and others. Exemptions from the VAT base and 
other structural features that result from the legislative process can impose a series of 
perverse incentives that distort producer and consumer prices and cause additional 
efficiency losses. At a minimum, this means that the efficiency gains from moving to an 
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actually implemented VAT are lower than those that would be obtained by moving to an 
optimal VAT and that efforts should be made to lessen these additional distortions, but 
could suggest that a VAT is not always the best tax choice.  
The purpose of this paper is to identify and examine some of the key VAT policy 
issues that have arisen in the implementation of the tax. Specifically, the paper examines 
four issues as examples of the specific inefficiencies that arise in actual practice with 
VATs. The first section examines the effect of registration thresholds, normally allowed 
to lessen administrative burdens, as an example of structural inefficiencies. The second 
section examines the tariff effects arising from administration of the VAT at border. The 
third section considers application of the VAT on financial services as an example of 
exemptions from the tax. Finally, the problem of distributing the revenues of a 
destination VAT levied at the subnational level is discussed. 
VAT Thresholds 
Nearly every VAT country allows a turnover threshold below which vendors are 
not required to register as taxpayers. Vendors with turnover above the threshold must 
register unless they are in an exempt industry. A small number of countries, such as Peru, 
have no threshold. From there, the range of threshold values is very broad, from 
relatively low amounts in countries such as Malawi ($1000), Georgia (($1500), and 
Romania ($7000) to relatively high levels in Cambodia ($125,000), Guinea ($134,000), 
and Morocco ($200,000).1 Choice of the threshold level is normally made by comparing 
the administrative/compliance effects of expanding the number of taxpayers with the 
revenue gains from a broader tax base. The tax administration in many developing 
countries is often presumed to be unable to handle large numbers of taxpayers with small 
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turnover and little value added and the threshold frees them from this responsibility. But, 
developed countries generally have thresholds as well. The incentive effects of a 
threshold have received relatively less attention and are considered here. 
In principle, existence of a threshold need have little effect on business operations 
if small vendors are selling to registered traders. The tax is simply added later in the 
production chain, and the only effect is that purchasers receive no credit for VAT 
imposed on purchases from small firms, allowing for some cascading of the tax. Also, 
small business sales to non-registered traders are only tax advantaged by the failure to 
impose tax on the last-stage firm’s value added. In practice, however, the threshold 
distorts many business structure decisions. Among the incentives that are distorted by a 
threshold are firm size, product mix, and horizontal and vertical integration. An important 
reason for the distortions is that firms must remit VAT on all of their sales once their 
turnover exceeds the threshold, and rates are often around 20 percent.2 As a result, the 
after tax producer price on all transactions immediately rises by the tax rate once the 
threshold is reached.  
The threshold will change the type of goods produced by businesses with turnover 
below the threshold and will affect firm size decisions. Small firms are tax advantaged in 
some cases vis-à-vis registered traders because they neither bear the compliance costs nor 
must remit the VAT. The advantage is limited if value added is a small share of revenues 
for the non-registered trader when selling to other non-registered traders, since the VAT 
is only avoided on the value added. However, in many sectors, the VAT savings can be a 
significant component of total business costs. On the other hand, non-registered traders 
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are disadvantaged in sales to registered traders because no credit is provided for tax 
implicit in purchased inputs, thereby allowing for cascading of the tax. The disadvantage 
grows with the relative importance of purchased inputs in the non-registered trader’s 
production process. Thus, small businesses are likely to be oriented towards the final 
consumer market unless they produce goods that have high value added relative to gross 
receipts.  
Keen and Mintz (2004) examine the optimal threshold value and conclude that 
thresholds are likely to create discontinuities in firm size3, which is certainly not 
surprising since once the threshold is reached the tax is imposed on all sales and not only 
on the margin above the threshold.4 Firms can be expected to bunch based on size, either 
hovering just below the threshold or lying well above it. This would appear to have 
important effects on the way that businesses expand, as they will not feel free to grow 
continuously, but will only rise above the threshold once the decision is made to expand 
significantly. In other words, a vendor below the threshold would only want to consider 
growing if revenues could be dramatically increased, given the immediate increase in 
costs (taxes) at the threshold that can be approximately 20 percent of revenues. The 
marginal incentive to evade taxes is particularly large at a threshold, likely increasing the 
extent of underreporting of sales for firms that are above, but close to the threshold. 
Another response for some businesses will be to split operations into many small 
units, each of which lies just below the threshold. Using business splitting to evade taxes 
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is often illegal, but finding companies where this is taking place could be very difficult 
for the tax administration, particularly if each individual company is in the name of a 
different family member, or has a name that is sufficiently distinct so that the tax 
administration would have difficulty realizing the relationships. Business splitting 
imposes the compliance costs of operating multiple firms and potentially the loss of 
economies from operating as a single firm (though the business splitting may be in name 
only). 
Vertical and horizontal integration can also be discouraged since taking advantage 
of either can increase the chance that firms will exceed the threshold. Discouraging either 
form of integration means lower profits when the production conditions indicate the 
potential to take advantage of economies of scale and scope. The effects are probably 
modest in most circumstances if the threshold is set low, but the small scale of many 
business operations in developing countries could result in important implications, 
particularly when combined with the effects of other exemptions.   
Kyrgyzstan, where the VAT was only recently extended to agricultural 
production, provides an illustrative example of how thresholds can influence the 
agriculture sector and business structure decisions. Individual farmer turnover generally 
lies below the Kyrgyz threshold, even though the threshold is relatively small on 
international standards, so extension of the VAT was only expected to impose 
registration responsibilities on the largest firms. However, the World Bank and other 
parts of the international community have assisted small farmers in forming cooperatives 
that will among other services market farm products. The combined activity in each 
cooperative reaches the threshold and subjects the sales of many very small farmers to a 
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20 percent tax on being a member of the cooperative. Initial anecdotal evidence indicates 
that cooperatives are dissolving because of the tax, potentially resulting in significant 
efficiency losses in the sector. Imposition of the tax on cooperatives would have had little 
effect if the tax on food products were otherwise imposed at retail, but the tendency for 
many food products, and particularly those that have no processing, to be sold through 
small vendors or the informal market meant that the tax would not otherwise be imposed. 
Thus, the VAT is being imposed for the first time on some agricultural products. Small 
farmers apparently buy very few inputs on which VAT has been paid, so the ability to 
obtain credits is of very limited benefit. 
VAT treatment of agriculture has also influenced vertical integration in 
Kyrgyzstan. Food processing but not food production was subject to the VAT prior to the 
recent extension of the tax to agriculture production. The result was a strong incentive to 
vertically integrate the food industry since the exemption for food production was in 
practice extended to processing when a single firm performed both. Much of the 
processed agricultural products were exported so there was no intent to impose VAT 
anywhere in the chain and no distortion should have occurred. However, domestic 
production was treated very differently depending on the degree of vertical integration. 
Processors were discouraged from purchasing from other producers since this signaled 
imposition of the VAT. In this case, interestingly, the VAT encouraged what is regarded 
by many as an important efficiency in the agricultural industry, the ability of food 
processors to guarantee high quality good production by producing their own inputs. 
The incentives inherent in the VAT may be an important reason for the trend in 
business structure in Kyrgyzstan. Individual entrepreneurs have grown as a share of 
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employment and value added while small and medium sized enterprises have diminished 
in importance during the years following adoption of the VAT. Nonetheless, large firms 
continue to provide a large majority of value added and employment. 
VAT Tariff Effects on Exports 
The VAT has often been viewed as export friendly because of the border 
adjustments that impose the tax on imports and rebate it on exports. However, this is 
derived from a theoretical perspective of the tax. In fact, a number of elements of the 
VAT as actually imposed have a strong potential to discourage international trade and 
exports, and effectively cause the VAT to operate as a tariff on both imports and exports 
(though at different rates). First, the effective tax rate on exports is much greater than 
zero since the tax on inputs used in the production of exports is included until rebates are 
received, and this implies a significant opportunity cost of funds, particularly in 
developing countries where working capital is often relatively scarce. Further, VAT for 
which credits are not received (such as when a non-registered trader sells to a registered 
trader) is included in the producer prices.  
Second, rebates for exports are often difficult to obtain. Many countries have 
made it impossible to obtain cash refunds or allowed cash refunds for VAT on 
intermediate transactions only after a significant delay. Until recently, for example, 
Kyrgyzstan did not provide for cash rebates of VAT on zero-rated transactions. Cash 
payments are now allowed but there continue to be long delays. These violations of the 
conceptual VAT structure have evolved either because of concerns about fraudulent 
refund claims or to provide short-term increases in tax revenue. Firms that have little if 
any domestic tax liability against which to use credits, and therefore seek refunds, are 
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particularly affected. Thus, development of a specialized set of exporters is discouraged 
since they are likely to pay some VAT on the value of exports but firms that mix 
domestic sales and exports may bear little VAT on exports.  
Many countries also make it difficult to use VAT credits against other tax 
liabilities (including the VAT). For example, Kyrgyzstan and Romania only allow credits 
when supported with special invoices. Credits may also be disallowed under audit. 
Disallowance of legitimate credits results in pyramiding of the VAT. The motivation, as 
with export rebates, is fear of fraudulent credit claims and pressure on the Tax 
Administration to increase revenues. These concerns about fraud may be valid, but they 
come at a potentially high cost in terms of international trade and business structure. 
Thus, governments must carefully consider alternative means of reducing fraud. 
Also, VAT may be imposed at higher effective rates on imports than on domestic 
production, even though by statute the VAT is to be applied evenly. This occurs if 
imports can be controlled more effectively than domestic production. Administration of 
the VAT on imports through the Customs Bureau and VAT on domestic activity through 
the Tax Administration can also affect the effective tax rate, depending on the practices 
exercised by each. Higher VAT rates on imports than on domestic production create a 
tariff that discourages imports. The reduction in imports can reduce exports as trade 
balances. 
Desai and Hines (2002) examine the relationship between reliance on the VAT 
and exports.5 They conclude that imposition of a VAT can reduce exports by one-third or 
more, and that the greatest effects on exports are in the lowest income countries. 
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International trade is also found to decline with the rising role of VAT in the tax mix. 
Further, US multinational firms are found to reduce their exports from a country by 5 
percent for every 10 percent increase in VAT collections. These results do not 
demonstrate causality, but certainly suggest that VATs are not uniform consumption 
taxes, but instead are imposed much more heavily on the international sector, that the 
tariff effects of a VAT are large and that the tariff effects can significantly reduce a 
country’s ability to export.  
One option to rely more heavily upon if the tariff effects of VATS cannot be lessened is 
appropriately structured free economic zones. The zones can be used as a means of 
exporting domestic production because inputs are often imported into the zone without 
imposition of VAT and exports are zero-rated. This suggests the opportunity to lessen the 
tariff effects, though VAT implicit in domestically purchased inputs still needs to be 
promptly rebated to the zone-based producers if the implicit VAT is to be lowered. Free 
economic zones can lessen the VAT implications (and other constraints) for 
producer/exporters, however, they are unlikely to assist development of specialized 
exporters because of production requirements in the zones. The zones must be structured 
to limit sales into the domestic economy to a small share of total production and to 
impose all relevant taxes on sales into the domestic economy or domestic production 
outside the zones will be relatively disadvantaged on both domestic and export 
production. 
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Exemption of Financial Services 
 Most countries that impose an invoice-credit VAT exempt financial services,6 
meaning that VAT is not levied on the supply of financial services, and credits are not 
allowed for VAT incurred on inputs (thus, financial institutions pay VAT on purchases of 
taxable goods and services used in producing the exempted supplies).    
As Poddar (2003) notes, the two basic rationales for exemption under a VAT are 
(1) that the items to be exempted are used disproportionately by low-income people, and 
therefore exemption makes the VAT less regressive; and (2) the items to be exempted are 
merit goods, such as medical care and education.  Poddar observes that financial services 
exemptions may be considered to make the VAT system more regressive rather than less 
regressive, and some financial services, such as currency trading, may actually be 
considered demeritable transactions (because of undesirable speculation).  The exemption 
generally offered to the provision of financial services must then have an operational 
rationale, and indeed it does.  Although financial services generally are exempted from 
the VAT for practical, administrative reasons, as discussed below, some argue that 
financial services should be exempted, or zero-rated, for conceptual reasons, even if it 
were not so difficult to apply the VAT. 
Should Financial Services Be Taxed Under the VAT? 
It is not altogether clear that financial intermediation charges should be subject to 
VAT, even if they can be properly enumerated.  For business purchases of financial 
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services, there is a consensus view that they should remain untaxed.7  The view on 
consumer purchases is more contentious.   
There are two conventional views of the proper tax treatment of purchases of 
financial services by final consumers, which Boadway and Keen (2003) refer to as a 
“fallacy” and a “half truth” (60).  The fallacy is that financial services should not be taxed 
because they do not directly enter the consumer’s utility function.  The half-truth is the 
opposite conclusion that financial services are a commodity like any other and therefore 
should be taxed as such.  
Grubert and Mackie (2000) argue that financial services used by consumers are 
not consumption goods and therefore should not be in the base of a consumption tax.  The 
basic premise is that consumption goods directly yield utility to the consumer, and 
financial services do not directly yield utility (see also Chia and Whalley, 1999).8  Rather, 
they are properly considered as a business expense, part of the price of an investment.  In 
the future, the consumer sells the “saving good” and uses the proceeds to fund fully 
taxable consumption, much in the way that a real investment (a machine, say) is not 
taxed, but rather the future consumption financed by the machine is taxed.  Grubert and 
Mackie argue that any advice one receives in how most profitably to use the machine (or 
the saving good) represents a part of the machine’s total cost, and is properly expensed.  
Because financial intermediation services are part of the cost of investing, the fees must 
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be exempted in order to avoid distorting the consumer’s relative valuation of present and 
future consumption.9 
Chia and Whalley (1999), following a similar line of reasoning, conclude from 
numerical simulations of the U.S. economy that taxing goods alone, and not financial 
services, yields higher welfare than taxing both goods and financial services at a lower 
rate with equal yield.   
Several recent papers have reached a different conclusion and have accurately 
concluded that VAT should be collected on financial intermediation. Jack (2000) shows 
that in the case of implicit, spread-based charges, the finance charge automatically 
increases proportionately with a tax on final consumption, so taxing it would indeed 
distort the relative prices of present and future consumption.  Consider, as Jack does, the 
case of an individual who forgoes one unit of current consumption, with price normalized 
to $1, and faces a VAT rate of 50 percent.  By foregoing the one unit of consumption, he 
saves $1.50, which he deposits at a bank.  Suppose further that the market interest rate is 
10 percent, and the bank collects 20 percent on its loans, leaving an interest spread 
(financial intermediation charge) of 10 percent.  In the absence of a VAT applied to the 
financial intermediation charge, the relative price of period 2 consumption and period 1 
consumption is 1.50/1.65 ≈ 0.91, the same relative price that would attain in the absence 
of a VAT (1.0/1.1).    Under a VAT applied to the financial intermediation charge, 50 
percent is paid on the fee, or $0.075, leaving relative prices of 1.50/1.575 ≈ 0.95.  
Charging VAT on the intermediation charge has increased the relative price.  In this case, 
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where the value-added is proportional to the nominal value of the underlying transfer, 
financial intermediation services should not be taxed, as asserted by Grubert and Mackie 
(2000).   
Application of VAT has different efficiency implications for the two types of 
financial intermediation fees that arise. In the case of fixed fees, such as a monthly 
account fee, it is irrelevant whether the financial service is subject to VAT, as the tax is 
effectively lump sum and does not affect decisions on the margin (there is only an 
income effect).  In the case of what Jack calls “quasi-fixed fees” (842), however, there is 
an efficiency argument for applying the VAT.  Quasi-fixed fees are charges that are 
proportional to the real value of the underlying transfer, such as fees levied at a fixed 
amount per transaction (e.g., ATM fees and per-check fees).  In this case, in the absence 
of a VAT, the relative price of period 2 consumption (on the margin) is 1.00/1.05 ≈ 0.95 
(20 percent interest on $1.00 less the $0.15 transaction fee is $1.05).  With a VAT that 
exempts financial intermediation charges, the relative price is a lower 1.50/1.65 ≈ 0.91.  
With the VAT applied to the financial intermediation fee, the relative price is the same as 
in the no-tax case, 1.50/1.575 ≈ 0.95.  In the case of quasi-fixed fees, efficiency calls for 
the application of VAT to financial intermediation charges.   
Fortunately, it is fixed fees and quasi-fixed fees that are easily enumerated, and 
therefore immune from the more practical difficulties in levying VAT on financial 
intermediation. 
 Auerbach and Gordon (2002) would extend Jack’s (2000) coverage of the VAT to 
include taxing financial intermediation charges embedded in financial margins.  They 
argue that Jack implicitly ignores the presence of real inputs in the production of financial 
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services.  Using the theoretical equivalence of a VAT and a labor-income tax as a guide 
in their modeling, they show that both nominal after-tax wage income and nominal 
consumer prices are the same under a VAT and a labor-income tax.  All primary and 
intermediate inputs used in generating financial transactions should be subject to the 
VAT to maintain neutrality under this system.  Auerbach and Gordon agree with Jack 
(and also Chia and Whalley, 1999) in that certain transaction costs, such as liquidity and 
risk premia, do not include real inputs and increase in proportion to the nominal size of 
the transactions, and thus should not be taxed. 
 An additional reason for including the financial intermediation charge embedded 
in financial margins in the tax base, other than the arguments of Auerbach and Gordon 
(2002), is that the substitutability between forms of consideration (fee or margin) may 
generate other inefficiencies.  If explicit fees are taxable under the VAT, but implicit fees 
embedded in financial margins are not, there will be an incentive to substitute margin 
fees for explicit fees.  This presumably is the reason why explicit fees generally are 
exempted from the VAT, even though the conventional view is that financial 
intermediation charges should be taxed, but are not for practical reasons (Poddar, 2003). 
 Whether one takes the view that financial services should be taxed fully under the 
VAT, should be zero-rated under the VAT, or some intermediate view, the normal 
practice followed by countries of exempting financial transactions is probably not the 
optimal policy.  Under the prevailing view that financial services should be taxed, but it 
is administratively difficult to do so, exemption likely represents a compromise (between 
full taxation and zero-rating) (Poddar, 2003).  In the case of exempted supplies to final 
consumers, the effective tax rate generally will be less than the standard rate, but it will 
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not be zero, as is the case when supplies are zero-rated.  Because of the lack of input tax 
credits, exemption allows the collection of some tax on items that would otherwise be 
untaxable (for practical reasons).  Chia and Whalley (1999) and Boadway and Keen 
(2003) argue that the optimal tax rate on financial services may be some positive rate less 
than the standard rate.  In this sense exemption may be preferred to either zero-rating or 
taxation at the standard rate.  But the fact remains that inputs are taxed under an 
exemption-based system, and a better choice, conceptually if not practically, would be to 
tax final purchases at the optimal rate and allow for a deduction of input tax. 
 Efficiency issues arise with exemption for registered traders that do not arise in 
the case of full taxation or zero-rating.  In the case of exempted supplies to 
intermediaries, tax cascading can occur because the input tax on exempted supplies will 
be embedded in the price paid.  In some cases, exemption results in a higher tax burden 
than inclusion (Merrill and Adrion, 1995).  Exemption provides an incentive to vertically 
integrate so as to avoid nonrecoverable VAT costs.  Moreover, allocation of input tax 
credit to taxable and exempted supplies provides additional fodder for distortions and 
imposes a wasteful administrative and compliance burden.  The apportionment system, 
which varies widely by country, creates incentives for firms to structure financial 
transactions in such a way as to minimize VAT liability, raising complicated transfer 
pricing questions (Merrill and Adrion, 1995). 
 The work of Jack (2000) and Auerbach and Gordon (2002) suggests that financial 
intermediation services should be taxed under the VAT, including fixed fees, per-
transaction fees, and the portion of financial margins that covers financial intermediation.  
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The question then becomes how to tax financial services, especially as it applied to fees 
embedded in financial margins. 
Practical Issues in Applying VAT to Financial Intermediation 
Although some financial intermediation fees, like monthly checking account fees 
and automatic teller machine (ATM) charges, are explicitly enumerated, most are hidden 
in other charges.  The financial intermediation charge is conceptually and practically 
difficult to separate from interest rate margins, premiums, and other financial margins 
charged by financial institutions, from which they derive the large bulk of their revenues.  
The financial intermediation charge is reflected in a higher interest cost to the borrower 
and a lower return to the lender. 
Under the assumption that charges for financial intermediation should be included 
in the VAT base, proposals have been offered for ways to get around this thorny problem 
of separating interest rate margins and risk premiums from financial intermediation. 
Poddar (2003) argues four principles in doing so.  The first principle is that nothing more 
than the financial intermediation charge should appear in the tax base.  Ad hoc levies 
imposed by many developing countries, such as taxes on gross insurance premiums, fail 
in this regard because the financial intermediation charge is premiums less claims.  The 
second principle is that modifications to the exemption system should reduce the tax on 
business inputs, therefore eliminating some tax cascading.  The third principle is that 
modifications should lead to a broadening of coverage of financial services, as much of 
the inefficiencies inherent in the exemption system relate to its narrow base.  Finally, 
modifications to the exemption system should generate administrative and compliance 
costs and economic distortions that are less burdensome than current practice. 
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The application of VAT to fixed fees and quasi-fixed fees is straightforward and 
consistent with Poddar’s guidelines.  The problem is in including implicit fees; 
specifically, enumerating that portion of financial margins that is representative of 
financial intermediation charges.  Israel gets around this problem via the addition 
method; that is, they levy tax directly on wages and profits (see Boadway and Keen, 
2003).  Another option proposed in Canada was the subtraction method (Canadian 
Department of Finance, 1987): levying the tax on the excess of outputs over inputs. 10  
The problem with both of these alternatives is that although they are effective in 
determining aggregate value-added from financial intermediation, they cannot allocate 
VAT on a per-transaction basis to taxable consumers and nontaxable businesses (see 
Boadway and Keen, 2003).  The use of formulas in allocating the tax base would likely 
generate administrative complexities and tax planning opportunities, undermining any 
efficiency gains in bringing financial services under the VAT umbrella (Merrill and 
Adrion, 1995). 
The preferred approach, considered at length in the European Union, may be to 
employ a cash flow tax (Institute of Fiscal Studies, 1978; Merrill and Adrion, 1995; 
Merrill and Edwards, 1996; Boadway and Keen, 2003; Poddar, 2003).  Under the cash 
flow method, all cash inflows (whether in the nature of income or capital) are treated as 
taxable sales and are subject to tax.  This would include the receipt of a loan and interest 
receipts.  All outflows, such as the repayment of loans and interest payments, are treated 
as taxable purchases and are entitled to rebate.  As long as the interest rate available to 
the government is considered the pure interest rate, the cash-flow method correctly 
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allocates value-added and allows for proper crediting of input tax (Boadway and Keen, 
2003).   
Boadway and Keen provide a simple example as to how a cash-flow approach 
would work.11  They consider a loan of $1,000 to a registered trader at 15 percent, which 
is financed by a $1,000 deposit (from a consumer) earning 5 percent.  The VAT rate is 10 
percent.  The bank must pay $100 tax on the deposit (an inflow), which is offset by a 
$100 credit when the loan is made (an outflow).  When the loan is repaid, it owes tax of 
$115 (on an inflow of $1,150), and when the deposit is withdrawn, it takes a credit of 
$105 (on an outflow of $1,050).  The net tax paid is $10, exactly 10 percent of the 
financial intermediation charge given by the 10 percent interest rate spread on a $1,000. 
The cash flow approach is not without its own set of problems, however (Merrill 
and Adrion, 1995; Poddar, 2003).  First, borrowers would have to pay tax on the gross 
amount of their loan, which may constrain liquidity.  Second, borrowers, in addition to 
financial institutions, would have to calculate tax on all financial flows, which may be 
overly complex and burdensome administratively.  Finally, the cash-flow method 
achieves the theoretically correct amount of tax on financial services only in present 
value over the course of the financial transaction.  Thus, transition would cause windfall 
gains and losses, as would the changing of VAT rates over the course of the transaction. 
The Tax Calculation Account (TCA) system gets around some of the drawbacks 
associated with the cash-flow method (Poddar, 2003); specifically, solving the liquidity 
and transition problems.  The collection and crediting of tax on inflows and outflows of a 
capital nature is suspended.  The net tax is payable at the end of the transaction and is the 
applicable tax on interest received minus the interest at the indexing rate (which reflects 
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the pure time value of money) on the deferred tax.  Likewise, the net credit is the 
applicable credit on interest paid plus the interest at the indexing rate on the deferred 
credit amount.  
Conclusions 
 While there remains some disagreement in the literature, our feeling is that the 
sum of the theoretical arguments favors taxing financial intermediation charges, and this 
should be done if tax administration is sufficiently strong so that financial intermediation 
charges embedded in financial margins can be taxed, most likely via a cash-flow 
approach or tax calculation account.   
Exemption raises a host of efficiency issues, including the taxation of 
intermediate inputs, incentives to vertically integrate so as to avoid nonrecoverable VAT 
costs, and incentives to structure financial transactions so as apportion the maximum 
amount of input tax to taxable supplies.  Even if our view coincided with that of Grubert 
and Mackie (2000), the view being that financial services should not be taxed, exemption 
would not be the optimal policy, but rather zero-rating. 
In countries where administration is weak, however, exemption may be a 
reasonable compromise policy.  As noted above, the effective tax rate on exempted sales 
to final consumers will be less than the standard rate, but positive.  Exemption therefore 
allows the collection of some tax on items that would otherwise be untaxable.  Moreover, 
research suggests that the optimal tax rate on financial services may be some positive rate 
less than the standard rate.  In these cases, probably all financial intermediation charges 
should be exempted, including those, such as fixed fees, that are easily enumerated. 
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Allocating Input Tax Credits in a Federal VAT System 
In a federal system with multiple VATs at differential rates, a destination-based 
VAT generally is preferred to an origin-based VAT on the grounds of production 
efficiency.  For practical reasons, however, there is cause to consider an origin-based 
VAT: conventional wisdom used to be that a subnational VAT would have to be imposed 
on an origin basis to avoid the necessity of border controls (Cnossen and Shoup, 1987; 
Hill and Rushton, 1993; Bird and Gendron, 2001).  Recently there have been several 
proposals to design a system in which destination-based VATs may be imposed in the 
absence of border controls. Thus, mechanisms are available for distributing revenues, 
albeit often with significant administrative costs or limitations on federalism, allowing 
governments to design destination based subnational VATs. Nonetheless, the result 
remains that the administrative and compliance costs of allocating subnational VAT 
revenues on a destination basis must be netted out against the efficiency gains of using a 
subnational VAT versus other revenue sources. This section briefly discusses these 
proposals and highlights their relative merits and demerits. 
The main issue is the crediting of input tax when there are cross-border sales.12  
Consider two subnational regions A and B, herein referred to as states, with VAT rates of 
15 percent and 20 percent, respectively.  Firm X in state A exports goods worth 100, 
produced with 60 worth of inputs, to firm Y in state B.  A destination-based system 
would levy a tax of 20 (20% x 100) to state B, and the exporter would receive a credit of 
9 (15% x 60) for taxes paid in A.  But it is unreasonable for state B to provide credits for 
                                                 
12 The problem of cross-border shopping to avoid tax or to take advantage of differential rates also has 
received a great deal of attention in the discussion of systems of subnational VATs.  That issue is not 
discussed here. 
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taxes paid in A.  The issue is how tax links are to be maintained between traders and 
input tax appropriately credited. 
Revenue-Sharing 
 One option is to have a single VAT administered by the central government, with 
part (or all in the case of Australia) of the proceeds shared among lower level 
jurisdictions.  This is the most common system in place today (Bird and Gendron, 2001).  
Distribution to subnational jurisdictions is accomplished via a formulary approach or on 
the basis of consumption statistics.  This approach has obvious benefits from the 
perspective of administrative and compliance burdens, but is really no different than a 
standard fiscal equalization measure (McLure, 2000b; Bird and Gendron, 2001).  A 
revenue sharing system does not give subnational governments revenue autonomy and 
accountability, which are critical for attaining the full benefits of fiscal federalism, nor is 
such a system likely to be acceptable to many subnational governments, as was the case 
with the National Sales Tax proposal in Canada that preceded its GST (Hill and 
Rushton).13 
Independent Subnational VATs 
The other extreme, which makes sense only in countries with very well-developed 
tax administrations at the subnational level, is to allow each jurisdiction to impose its 
own VAT with its own rates, and perhaps its own base.  Input tax crediting would be 
dealt with via a zero-rating/deferred payment or a clearing house approach (Cnossen and 
Shoup, 1987).   
                                                 
13 Three Maritime Provinces in Canada –  Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick – have 
accepted a variant of this system under what is referred to as the Harmonized Sales Tax.  See Bird and 
Gendron (1998, 2001) for a brief description of this system. 
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Following the example from above, under a deferred payment approach, currently 
in place in the European Union (EU), exports are zero-rated and X claims an input tax 
credit of 9 (15% of 60) from state A.  If Y is a registered trader, it does not pay import 
tax, but rather, pays the VAT on the import when it makes its final sale (because there is 
no input tax credit).  There are some problems with this approach, most notably the 
possibility that final consumers will evade tax by “masquerading as registered traders” 
(McLure, 2000b, 303; see also Keen and Smith, 1996), although this can be prevented, or 
at least mitigated, with effective administration of an overlaid national tax (Bird and 
Gendron, 1998).  
Under a clearinghouse mechanism, the exporter (X) would pay 6 (15% of 100 less 
input tax of 9) to its state of registration, A.  Y would not pay a compensating import tax, 
and would apply for a credit of 6 from state B, its state of registration.  State B would 
then claim compensation of 6 from state A, which would be handled by a clearinghouse.  
A major benefit with this system over the zero-rating/deferred payment is that the tax 
chain is not broken – goods cross the border with tax in tow.  But McLure (2000b) notes 
that this system is “almost certainly too complicated to be practical” (304) and that the 
importing state has no incentive to carefully audit the claims for credits to be reimbursed 
by the exporting state. 
Bird and Gendron (1998) argue that the dual VAT approach with zero-
rating/deferred payment works fairly well in Québec, where the Québec VAT (the 
Québec Sales Tax, or QST) is applied to the price of goods and services inclusive of the 
federal Goods and Services Tax (GST).  The key difference in Québec and the system of 
VATs in the EU is the existence of an overriding federal VAT.  Bird and Gendron (1998) 
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note that the Québec government, which administers both the QST and GST, has an 
incentive to monitor the GST because the QST is applied to a GST-inclusive base, and 
that federal GST audits serve as a crosscheck, to some extent, to ensure that QST has not 
been evaded. 
Intermediate Options 
Two intermediate options have been proposed in recent years: a compensating 
VAT (CVAT) (McLure, 2000a), and a viable integrated VAT (VIVAT) (Keen and Smith, 
1996; Keen, 2000). 
The CVAT is in some sense a dual VAT, but only for intrastate sales.  Exporters 
out of state would essentially zero-rate sales, but these sales would be subject to a central 
CVAT, which is levied at the same rate for all states.  Credit is of course allowed for tax 
on purchases of registered traders, both under the state VAT for intrastate trade and the 
CVAT for interstate trade.  Continuing with our example from above, firm X would zero-
rate the sale to Y and would receive a credit of 9 for tax paid on inputs.  State B would 
defer payment of VAT until final sale, but the central government would tax the interstate 
sale at the CVAT rate.  Upon final sale, firm Y would apply for a credit for the CVAT 
paid.  In the case where interstate sales are between registered traders, the end result is 
the same as in the dual VAT case, and no CVAT is collected on net (it is collected then 
credited).  In the case of interstate sales to unregistered traders or final consumers, the 
CVAT is a final tax, and the central government would then allocate the revenues to the 
various states in some systematic way, presumably on the basis of interstate sales to final 
consumers. 
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VIVAT is a two-tiered VAT structure.  The first tier is a nation-wide tax levied at 
a uniform rate across states.  Sales between registered traders are taxed at this uniform 
rate, but final sales are taxed at independently determined state rates.  The system is 
equivalent to a uniform base rate applied to the good or service and a system of 
secondary rates equal to the difference between the state-specific rates and the nationwide 
uniform rate (Keen, 2000).  In our hypothetical case, the VIVAT works in a fashion 
similar to the CVAT.  Assume that the VIVAT uniform rate is 17 percent.  Firm X would 
pay 8 in tax (17 output tax less 9 for input tax).   Upon final sale, firm Y would apply the 
20 percent rate in state B and take an input tax credit of 17.  Again, in the case where 
interstate sales are between registered traders, the end result is the same as in the dual 
VAT case, and no central tax is collected on net (it is collected then credited).   
Conclusions 
 There are trade-offs in each of the various ways of instituting a subnational VAT 
in a federal system without border controls.  The dual VAT is most attractive in the sense 
of revenue autonomy and accountability in that there is no “central edict” with respect to 
the state taxes applied to interstate trade, since no such taxes are applied (Bird and 
Gendron, 2000, 754).   States set their own rates under the CVAT and VIVAT schemes, 
but a uniform rate is applied to interstate sales.  In countries where interstate trade is 
significant, revenue autonomy and accountability are undermined relative to the dual 
VAT case.  
Where the CVAT and VIVAT seem to have an advantage over the dual VAT is in 
maintaining the tax chain for interstate sales, thereby reducing the vulnerability of the 
system to fraud.  This is especially important in a case where there is no federal VAT, a 
 25
case for which the VIVAT was especially designed.  CVAT would have an advantage in 
cases where subnational tax administration is relatively weak. 
   In countries where there is an overlaying federal VAT and subnational tax 
administrations are very developed, such as Canada, the dual VAT seems like an 
attractive candidate.   The simplicity of the CVAT is a more attractive option for 
countries with less developed tax administrations.  Finally, in cases where subnational tax 
administrations are well-developed, but no federally administered VAT exists as a cross-
check for noncompliance, the VIVAT offers a reasonable approach that balances 
subnational autonomy in rate setting with a maintenance of a consistent tax chain.
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